The relationship between the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme and other innovation policy instruments by Hægeland, Torbjørn & Møen, Jarle
 2007/45 Rapporter Reports 
Torbjørn Hægeland and Jarle Møen 
The relationship between the 
Norwegian R&D tax credit 
scheme and other innovation 
policy instruments 
 
 
 
 
Statistisk sentralbyrå • Statistics Norway 
Oslo–Kongsvinger 
  
Rapporter I denne serien publiseres statistiske analyser, metode- og modellbeskrivelser fra de 
enkelte forsknings- og statistikkområder. Også resultater av ulike enkeltunder-
søkelser publiseres her, oftest med utfyllende kommentarer og analyser. 
 
Reports This series contains statistical analyses and method and model descriptions from the 
various research and statistics areas. Results of various single surveys are also 
published here, usually with supplementary comments and analyses. 
 
 
 
 
© Statistics Norway, December 2007 
When using material from this publication, 
Statistics Norway shall be quoted as the source 
 
ISBN 978-82-537-7283-7 Trykt versjon 
ISBN 978-82-537-7284-4 Elektronisk versjon 
ISSN 0806-2056 
 
Emnegruppe 
10.03 
 
 
Design: Enzo Finger Design 
Trykk: Statistisk sentralbyrå 
Standardtegn i tabeller Symbols in tables Symbol
Tall kan ikke forekomme Category not applicable .
Oppgave mangler Data not available ..
Oppgave mangler foreløpig Data not yet available ...
Tall kan ikke offentliggjøres Not for publication :
Null Nil -
Mindre enn 0,5 
av den brukte enheten 
Less than 0.5 of unit 
employed 0
Mindre enn 0,05 
av den brukte enheten 
Less than 0.05 of unit 
employed 0,0
Foreløpig tall Provisional or preliminary figure *
Brudd i den loddrette serien Break in the homogeneity of a vertical series —
Brudd i den vannrette serien Break in the homogeneity of a horizontal series |
Desimalskilletegn Decimal punctuation mark ,(.)
   3 
Abstract 
Torbjørn Hægeland and Jarle Møen 
The relationship between the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme and other 
innovation policy instruments 
 
Reports 2007/45 • Statistics Norway 2007 
We first study how participation in the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme affects the probability of receiving other 
R&D and innovation subsidies. We find no evidence suggesting that using the R&D tax credit increase the probability 
of receiving direct R&D subsidies in the future, but we cannot exclude the possibility of an immediate positive effect. 
At the individual firm level, direct subsidies and the tax credit seem to be complements, while at the innovation 
system level they seem to be substitutes, as the probability of receiving direct subsidies has fallen after the 
introduction of the tax credit scheme.  
 
Next, we compare the additionality of the R&D tax credit with direct R&D subsidies. Our preferred estimate suggests 
that each public krone spent on tax credits for firms investing below the 4 million cap on intramural R&D increases 
private intramural R&D by 2.68 kroner. This estimate builds on an assumption of zero additionality for firms above 
the 4 million cap. We find that the additionality of subsidies awarded through the Research Council and Innovation 
Norway is 2.07 and 1.53 respectively. The additionality of grants awarded by ministries and other public agencies is 
0.64, and the additionality of R&D subsidies from the EU is 0.75. We stress the potential for both positive and 
negative biases in these estimates.  
 
Direct R&D subsidies are intended for projects with low private return and high social return. We find that projects 
funded through direct grants have essentially zero returns. Although surprisingly low, this is consistent with a high 
quality grant allocation process. Our estimate for the return to R&D projects financed by tax credits is just slightly 
below the return to R&D projects financed by own funds. This is to be expected as this type of R&D has a lower 
marginal price. The estimated returns are 16 % and 19 % respectively. All estimates are likely to be downward 
biased by measurement errors in the R&D variables. Furthermore, there is large variance in the returns to R&D 
projects. When estimating the return parameters year by year, they vary considerably around their overall mean. 
 
 
Acknowledgement: This is a part of Statistics Norway’s evaluation of the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme, 
financed by the Norwegian Research Council. 
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Ordninger og tiltak innføres sjelden eller aldri i et 
vakuum. De kommer gjerne i tillegg til eller i stedet for 
eksisterende ordninger, og implementeres i en virkelig-
het hvor andre lover, regelverk og andre generelle 
virkemidler også påvirker aktørenes tilpasning til og 
eventuelle effekter av den nye ordningen. Innføringen 
av SkatteFUNN-ordningen er ikke noe unntak fra dette. 
I denne rapportent studerer vi hvordan SkatteFUNN-
ordningen virker i samspill med andre virkemidler for 
FoU, med spesiell vekt på hvorvidt innføringen av 
SkatteFUNN har påvirket sannsynligheten for å få 
tilgang til eller benytte seg av andre deler av 
virkemiddelapparatet. I tillegg har vi sett på forskjeller 
i innsatsaddisjonalitet og avkastning mellom ulike 
typer virkemidler.  
 
FoU-subsidier gis hovedsakelig som direkte subsidier 
eller som en eller annen form for skattefradrag. 
Skatteinsentiver til FoU har blitt mer og mer populært i 
de siste tiårene, og i flere land er de et viktig 
supplement til direkte FoU-subsidier. I begge tilfeller er 
formålet fra myndighetenes side å subsidiere private 
FoU-prosjekter som blir vurdert som samfunns-
økonomisk lønnsomme, og som ikke ville ha blitt 
gjennomført uten støtte. 
 
Hvis myndighetene hadde perfekt informasjon, ville 
direkte subsidier være det foretrukne virkemiddelet. 
Prosjektene kunne da ha blitt støttet ut fra sin 
samfunnsøkonomiske lønnsomhet. Et skatteinsentiv 
ville være mindre effektivt, siden foretak rangerer sine 
investeringsprosjekter etter bedriftsøkonomisk 
lønnsomhet. Betydelige subsidier vil bli utbetalt til 
prosjekter som ville ha blitt gjennomført også uten 
støtte, og hvor den samfunnsøkonomiske avkastningen 
ikke nødvendigvis er høy.  
 
Imidlertid er det ikke slik at myndighetene sitter med 
perfekt informasjon, og det er kostbart å skaffe seg 
opplysninger om forventet bedrifts- og samfunns-
økonomisk avkastning av enkeltstående FoU-
prosjekter. Det er også kostbart for bedrifter å sende 
inn detaljert prosjektinformasjon til myndighetene. 
Avhengig av hvordan et skatteinsentiv designes, kan 
det være en billigere måte å administrere støtten på, 
både for myndigheter og foretak. En annen viktig 
fordel er at skatteinsentiver reduserer prisen på FoU på 
marginen. Dette gir et sterkt teoretisk argument for at 
et skatteinsentiv vil øke FoU-investeringene. Ved 
ufullstendig informasjon er det vanskeligere å rangere 
prosjekter i forhold til samfunnsøkonomisk avkastning. 
Foretakenes første prioritet må være å få støtte til de 
prosjektene de uansett ville ha gjennomført. 
Addisjonaliteten til direkte subsidier vil avhenge av 
kvaliteten på saksbehandlingen og oppriktigheten til 
foretakene i søknadsprosessen. Siden direkte subsidier 
tildeles gjennom en beslutningsprosess og ikke er 
rettighetsbaserte, kan de også være mer utsatte for 
lobbyvirksomhet på prosjektnivå. 
 
Mange av foretakene som har mottatt støtte gjennom 
SkatteFUNN, har ikke tidligere mottatt direkte 
subsidier til FoU. Gjennom å ha søkt om støtte fra 
SkatteFUNN, er det mulig at disse foretakene har blitt 
mer klar over eksistensen av andre virkemidler og 
muligheten for å søke støtte gjennom dem. Det er 
imidlertid viktig å påpeke at det er betydelige 
identifikasjonsproblemer knyttet til å estimere slike 
effekter, siden det finnes lite i våre data som kan kaste 
lys over hva foretakene som tidligere ikke har vært 
kontakt med virkemiddelapparatet ville ha gjort i 
fravær av SkatteFUNN-ordningen. Vi analyserer 
problemstillingen fra to vinkler. Vår første tilnærming 
er å analysere hvordan sannsynlighetene for å motta 
direkte subsidier til FoU har endret seg etter at 
SkatteFUNN ble innført. Denne analysen gjøres ved 
hjelp av data fra FoU-undersøkelsene for 1993-2005. 
Sannsynligheten for å motta direkte støtte øker med 
størrelsen på FoU-investeringene, og med størrelsen på 
tidligere direkte subsidier. Vi finner også at sann-
synligheten for å motta direkte subsidier er betydelig 
lavere i årene etter at SkatteFUNN ble innført. Den 
estimerte endringen i sannsynlighet er -16,2 prosent. 
Foretak som mottok støtte gjennom SkatteFUNN hadde 
imidlertid en 5,4 prosent høyere sannsynlighet for å 
motta direkte støtte enn andre foretak. En tolkning av 
disse resultatene er at SkatteFUNN er substitutter på 
makronivå (generelt lavere sjanse for å få direkte 
subsidier etter at SkatteFUNN ble innført), mens de er 
Sammendrag på norsk
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komplementære for individuelle foretak som søker 
støtte til sine FoU-prosjekter.  
 
I vår andre tilnærming ser vi på det samme spørsmålet 
ved bruk av data fra prosjekt- og kundedatabasene til 
Norges forskningsråd og Innovasjon Norge (inkludert 
forløpere), kombinert med informasjon fra 
SkatteFUNN-databasen og generell foretaksinfor-
masjon fra Statistisk sentralbyrås strukturstatistikk. 
Hovedformålet er å se hvorvidt eksistensen av 
SkatteFUNN ser ut til å ha stimulert foretak til å søke 
også andre former for støtte. Vi finner at foretak som 
har søkt Norges forskningsråd eller har mottatt en eller 
annen form for støtte fra Innovasjon Norge året før, 
har signifikant større sannsynlighet for å gjøre det 
samme året etter i perioden etter at SkatteFUNN ble 
innført. Det kan dermed synes som om SkatteFUNN 
har gitt noe større persistens i bruken av det øvrige 
virkemiddelapparatet. Vi finner imidlertid ingen tegn 
til at foretak som tidligere ikke har søkt Norges 
forskningsråd eller har mottatt en eller annen form for 
støtte fra Innovasjon Norge, har noen større sjanse for 
å gjøre dette etter at SkatteFUNN ble innført.  
 
I tillegg har vi gjort en nærmere analyse av foretakenes 
kontakt med Norges Forskningsråd og Innovasjon 
Norge etter at SkatteFUNN ble innført. Denne analysen 
viser igjen tydelig at de som har hatt kontakt med 
virkemiddelapparatet før innføringen av SkatteFUNN, 
også har større sannsynlighet for dette etter at 
ordningen ble innført.  I tillegg er SkatteFUNN-foretak 
i større grad enn andre i kontakt med virkemiddel-
apparatet. Dette er ingen overraskelse, siden foretak 
som driver med FoU vil forsøke ulike støttekilder. Det 
som er mer verdt å merke seg er at “SkatteFUNN-
effekten” ser ut til å være større for foretak som ikke 
tidligere har vært i kontakt med virkemiddelapparatet. 
Dette kan være en indikasjon på at SkatteFUNN leder 
foretak videre inn til andre deler av virkemiddel-
apparatet. Det kan imidlertid også indikere at andre 
deler av virkemiddelapparatet oppfordrer til eller 
krever at søkere også benytter seg av rettighetsbaserte 
ordninger som SkatteFUNN. 
 
Når vi sammenligner addisjonaliteten av SkatteFUNN-
støtte og direkte subsidier, tar vi utgangspunkt i 
rammeverket som er benyttet Hægeland og Møen 
(2007). Vi finner at foretak under beløpsgrensen for 
fradragsberettiget FoU i SkatteFUNN i gjennomsnitt 
øker sin FoU-investeringer med 2,68 kroner per krone 
de mottar i støtte gjennom SkatteFUNN. Det er ikke 
åpenbart hvorvidt dette skyldes selve skattekreditten 
eller at foretak selekterer seg inn i SkatteFUNN når de 
uansett ville ha økt sine FoU-investeringer.  
 
Den estimerte addisjonaliteten av direkte subsidier er 
noe lavere, 1,18 kroner per krone mottatt i støtte. Selv 
om den estimerte addisjonaliteten for direkte subsidier 
er lavere enn for SkatteFUNN, er størrelsen på 
koeffisientene en indikasjon på at slike ordninger også 
fungerer bra. Man vil forvente at eksternalitetene 
knyttet til prosjekter som er valgt til å få direkte 
subsidier er større enn for prosjekter som kvalifiserer 
til støtte gjennom SkatteFUNN, siden sistnevnte er 
valgt av foretakene utelukkende på bakgrunn av 
bedriftsøkonomisk lønnsomhet. I tillegg gjelder 
addisjonaliteten knyttet til SkatteFUNN bare foretak 
under beløpsgrensen.  Hvis vi splitter direkte subsidier 
etter finansieringskilde, finner vi at addisjonalitets-
effekten er størst for støtte gjennom Norges forsknings-
råd, og minst for støtte fra EU og departementer. 
 
Både direkte subsidier og SkatteFUNN er ment å 
stimulere til økte FoU-investeringer, men utvelgelsen 
av prosjekter er som nevnt fundamentalt forskjellig i de 
to typene ordninger. Direkte subidier tildeles i 
prinsippet ut fra samfunnsøkonomiske lønnsomhets-
kriterier, mens i SkatteFUNN er det foretakenes egne 
vurderinger som ligger til grunn. Ut fra dette skulle 
man forvente at den bedriftsøkonomiske avkastningen 
var høyere for SkatteFUNN-prosjekter. Vi har gjort en 
sammenlingning av sammenhengen mellom veksten i 
foretakenes totale faktorpoduktivitet og FoU finansiert 
henholdsvis gjennom egne midler, gjennom direkte 
subsidier og gjennom SkatteFUNN.  Under relativt 
strenge forutsetninger kan disse sammenhengene 
tolkes som bedriftsøkonomiske avkastningsrater. 
Avkastningsraten vi finner er i tråd med tidligere 
internasjonale og norske studier. Vårt beste anslag for 
den privatøkonomiske bruttoavkastningen på FoU er 
15 prosent. Vi finner at FoU utført med støtte fra 
SkatteFUNN har litt lavere avkastning enn egenutført 
FoU, mens den privatøkonomiske avkastningen av FoU 
finansiert av direkte subsidier er lavere. Det siste 
funnet er ikke overraskende, gitt at disse prosjektene 
selekteres etter andre kriterier. 
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Policies to stimulate innovation and economic growth 
are high on the policy agenda in all OECD-countries. A 
strong link between investments in research and 
growth is often taken for granted, and many countries 
have explicit and ambitious goals regarding the 
economy’s R&D intensity. In Norway, there is a 3 
percent target for R&D as a share of GDP. 
 
Setting a goal suggests that there is a role for govern-
ment intervention, and there are many potential 
market failures in the market for research and develop-
ment. In theory, these could lead to overinvestment as 
well as underinvestment, but based on empirical 
research there is a fairly broad consensus that a purely 
competitive market underinvests in R&D.1  
 
There are many policy tools available to improve upon 
the market outcome. First, governments may produce 
R&D themselves. Second, intellectual property right 
laws, ensuring that investors are able to capture the 
rents from innovations, are very important. Third, 
there are several important links between competition 
policies and innovation. Fourth, well regulated capital 
markets are crucial, and there may also be a role for 
public money in order to secure funding of new 
ventures. Finally, the government may subsidize R&D 
investments made by private firms. OECD countries 
spend large sums on R&D subsidies, and R&D policies 
receive much attention in the public debate. However, 
there is no strong consensus regarding the 
effectiveness of such policies.  
 
R&D subsidies are mainly given as R&D tax credits or 
through direct grants. 2 Tax incentives have become an 
increasingly popular policy tool over the last decades, 
and in several countries it is a very important 
supplement to direct R&D subsidies. In both cases, the 
aim of the policy from the point of view of the 
                                                     
1 See Griliches (2000) for a broad survey and Wieser (2005) for a 
recent meta-analysis.  
2 See Hall and van Reenen (2000), David, Hall and Toole (2000) 
and Garcia-Quevedo (2004) for useful surveys. See also Bloom, 
Griffith and van Reenen (2002) for an authoritative empirical 
analysis of R&D tax credits. 
 
government is to subsidize private R&D projects that 
would not be undertaken without a subsidy, and where 
the social rate of return is above the risk adjusted 
required rate of return on public investments.  
 
If the government had perfect information, direct 
subsidies would be the preferred tool, as projects could 
be given support based on their social rate of return. 
An R&D tax credit would be less efficient, as firms rank 
projects according to their private returns. Substantial 
subsidies will be paid to projects that would be 
undertaken without a subsidy, and where spillovers to 
other firms or consumers may be modest. This implies 
that under a tax credit there is (i) a deadweight loss, 
since some of the subsidies are pure transfers financed 
by tax revenues, and (ii) a non-optimal mix of projects 
undertaken because firms decide what projects to do 
themselves. However, public servants do not have 
perfect information, and acquiring information on 
private and particularly social returns is costly. 
Submitting detailed information to public agencies is 
also costly for firms. Depending on how the tax credit 
scheme is set up, administering subsidies through R&D 
tax credits may be cheaper for both government and 
firms. This is one main advantage of using tax credits 
for R&D. Another main advantage is that R&D tax 
credits reduce the price on R&D investments, giving 
incentives on the margin to increase R&D investments. 
Hence, there is a strong theoretical case for thinking 
that the R&D investments will increase. 
 
The ranking of projects according to social return is 
difficult with imperfect information. Firms’ first priority 
will be to get subsidies for projects they would 
undertake in any case. The degree of “additionality” 
from direct grants will depend on the quality of public 
servants and the honesty of firms. Since R&D subsidies 
are awarded through a discretionary process, it is also 
more vulnerable to lobbying, which may be a serious 
drawback. Furthermore, grants may be more 
vulnerable to year to year budget constraints and 
politicians’ short term priorities, than more “rights-
based” tax credit schemes. Lack of stability in R&D 
grants is very unfortunate, as firms’ R&D investments 
1. Introduction 
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are strategic and long term decisions with high 
adjustment costs. 
 
The present report concerns the relationship between 
the R&D tax credit scheme and other R&D incentives. 
It is organized as follows: The next section gives a brief 
overview of some different R&D support measures in 
Norway, with focus on direct subsidies from the 
Norwegian Research Council and the R&D tax credit, 
SkatteFUNN. Section 3 describes the data sources used 
in the report. In Section 4, we take a closer look at how 
the R&D tax credit has affected the probability of 
receiving direct R&D subsidies and other innovation-
related support. Section 5 presents a comparative 
analysis of the additionality effect of direct subsidies 
and subsidies given as a tax credit. In section 6, we 
look at the profitability of R&D financed by direct 
subsidies versus R&D financed by SkatteFUNN. The 
final section concludes. 
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2.1. Direct R&D subsidies 
Traditionally, Norwegian R&D subsidies have mainly 
been given as direct grants to firms. The main rule has 
been programs with “matching grants”, where firms 
are supposed to finance 50 percent of the project they 
apply for. Research by Klette and Møen (1998) 
suggests that this own risk money is taken from the 
ordinary R&D budget and hence would have been 
spent on R&D anyway. However, firms do not seem to 
reduce their private R&D budget when they receive 
subsidies. This implies that the “additionality” is 
around one, i.e. one krone in subsidy makes firms 
invest one krone more in R&D.  
 
Earlier research based on surveys from the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s is summarised in Klette and Møen 
(1998). A weighted average suggests that 34 percent of 
subsidized projects would not be carried out without 
the subsidy, 48 percent would be scaled down or 
delayed and 18 percent would be performed in full 
without a subsidy. 
 
Klette and Møen (1999) and Møen (2004) have 
evaluated a large Norwegian R&D subsidy program 
directed towards the IT industry running from 1987 to 
1990. Their conclusions are negative. Klette and Møen 
(1999) use firm level data only. Comparing subsidized 
and non-subsidized firms within the high tech 
industries, they find little evidence in favour of the 
subsidized firms being more successful. Next, looking 
at these industries relative to aggregate Norwegian 
manufacturing, their importance did not increase. 
Finally, comparing the development of the Norwegian 
IT industry to the IT industry of other OECD countries, 
the Norwegian industry did not perform particularly 
well. Klette and Møen concluded that “the IT-programs 
were largely unsuccessful”. The IT-programs seemed, 
however, well justified according to economic 
principles, and Klette and Møen related the lack of 
success largely to governmental failure such as 
informational problems and institutional inertia in the 
agencies heading the implementation of the programs. 
They noted that  
“…information is a serious obstacle … exactly 
which firms and what activities should be 
coordinated and in what way? These serious 
questions are very hard to answer in a rapidly 
developing field such as information technology 
and might be particularly hard to solve in a small 
open economy where a large majority of the 
innovations take place abroad. We believe that 
industrial innovation is an activity where 
coordination problems and ‘market failure’ often 
are pervasive, but it is probably also an activity 
where policy makers and bureaucrats often lack 
the information needed to improve on the market 
solution.” 
 
They also noted  
“…coordination problems created by 
complementary innovative activities across 
different firms seem in many cases to be at least 
partly resolved by private institutions such as 
industry associations, privately funded research 
joint ventures and other cooperative research 
agreements.” 
 
The program period analysed coincided with a severe 
recession, and also a technology shift from mini-
computers to PCs and open standards. This could be 
exogenous reasons why the program looked like a 
failure. Claims have been made that the growth of the 
Norwegian IT-industry in the late 1990s was 
stimulated by knowledge built up in formerly 
subsidized firms. In particular, employees of the fallen 
industry leader, Norsk Data, have been pointed to as 
key contributors in a new generation of successful 
firms.3 In this case, the evaluation by Klette and Møen 
may have underestimated the effect. Following up on 
this, Møen (2004) uses matched employer-employee 
data and trace workers out of the subsidized firms in 
order to investigate possible spillovers through labour 
mobility. The analysis shows that scientists and 
engineers with experience from subsidized IT-firms to 
a much larger extent than other scientists and 
engineers in high-tech industries migrated to the 
rapidly growing IT service industry. They have not 
                                                     
3 Norsk Data was the last IT company in a series of ‘national 
champions’ actively promoted by the Norwegian government. 
2. A brief overview of R&D support in 
Norway 
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performed badly, but there is no evidence indicating 
that these scientists and engineers played a particularly 
prominent role in the growth process, either. Nor do 
spin-off firms from the subsidized firms perform 
particularly well. In fact, they seem to have performed 
below, rather than above, average. One possible 
explanation for these discouraging results is that the 
technology shift in the late 1980s rendered much of 
the intellectual human capital built up under the 
programs obsolete. 
 
Another Norwegian evaluation project has been run by 
professor Arild Hervik at Møre Research. Hervik’s 
group has for many years collected data from so-called 
user oriented research projects subsidized by the 
Research Council of Norway. Basically they have been 
asking firms what they would have done in absence of 
subsidies, what profits have been realized and what 
they expect from the subsidized projects in terms of 
future profits. Hervik, Bræin, Bremnes and Bergem 
(2006) report that for the years 1997 to 2005, 45 
percent of the firms say that their R&D project would 
have been abandoned without the R&D subsidy. 2 
percent say the project would have been carried 
through without any changes, and 52 percent say the 
project would have been carried out at a smaller scale 
or with a delay. 
 
Hervik et al summarize their main results as follows: 
“A principal finding is that a few projects have the 
potential to generate private sector returns greater 
than the cost of all projects surveyed. Actual 
development of competence, new technologies 
and networking are often more important to the 
companies than private sector returns in the long 
run. The projects contribute to the creation of new 
knowledge; publication of scientific articles, PhD 
theses and co-operation between universities and 
research institutes, showing that there are positive 
external effects. Half of the projects would not 
have been realized without support and more than 
140 projects (with full additionality) started in the 
period 1995-2002 are reported to achieve a net 
present value of NOK 2.4 billion. The private 
sector returns are much higher (NOK 8.4 billion) if 
we include projects with low additionality. 
However, without support the projects would be 
reduced and the potential for external effects 
would be diminished. The Research Council's 
project evaluation system (Provis) appears to be a 
well functioning tool for selecting good quality 
projects for support.” (Our translation). 
 
Obviously, a key identifying assumption behind this 
research is that the firms are both able and willing to 
reveal the profitability of the individual projects, and 
what they would have done in absence of a subsidy. 
2.2. The Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme 
Introducing an R&D tax credit in Norway was proposed 
by the Hervik Commission in a green paper for the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (NOU 2000:7). The 
commission was appointed to suggest policy measures 
aimed at encouraging industry to invest more in R&D. 
The Norwegian Parliament had earlier in 2000 agreed 
to make increased R&D investments a national priority, 
and decided that R&D relative to GDP should at least 
reach the OECD average by 2005. This illustrates a 
general point. Generous R&D tax credit schemes are 
often introduced in countries with low R&D 
investments by international standards, and where the 
sentiment is that “something needs to be done”.  
 
The Hervik commission suggested using an R&D tax 
credit as one of several policy tools to stimulate R&D 
investments. They emphasized that the R&D tax credit 
they proposed would be administratively simpler and 
more robust to informational problems than direct 
subsidies. It was intended to be the main policy tool 
towards small and medium sized firms (SMEs). In the 
commission’s opinion, the Norwegian Research Council 
should focus on R&D of strategic importance and 
spend their resources initiating and evaluating large 
projects. It also emphasized that a “rights-based” R&D 
tax credit would give more stable conditions for the 
business community than direct subsidies. The total 
subsidy would not be subject to annual budget debates, 
and the detailed regulations would be embedded in the 
general tax code. Of course, the specifics of the 
scheme, such as deduction rates and rules on eligibility 
etc. could change over time, but it was a widely held 
view that it would be less vulnerable to “overnight” 
changes than would direct subsidies. 
 
The tax credit scheme, called SkatteFUNN, was 
introduced in 2002.4 SkatteFUNN implies that firms 
can deduct from tax payable a certain amount of their 
R&D expenditures. Firms are entitled to the tax credit 
as long as the R&D-project has been approved by the 
Research Council of Norway.  
 
Originally, only SMEs were eligible. SME were defined 
as firms fulfilling two out of the following three 
criteria: (i) Fewer than 100 employees (ii) an annual 
turnover less than 80 million NOK – about 10 million 
Euros (iii) an annual balance sheet total less than 40 
million NOK – about 5 million Euros.  
 
Already in 2003 large enterprises were included as 
well. Large enterprises may deduct from taxes owed 18 
percent of expenses related to an approved R&D 
project. 20 percent deduction is possible if the 
following conditions for being a “small enterprise” are 
fulfilled: (i) Fewer than 250 employees, (ii) an annual 
                                                     
4 The following description borrows at some places directly from 
OECD (2007, p. 112), Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka (2007a, 
Appendix A) and http://web.skattefunn.no/index.php?kat=English 
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turnover not exceeding Euro 40 millions or an annual 
balance sheet total not exceeding Euro 27 millions and 
(iii) less than 25 per cent of the company is owned by 
a large enterprise. This distinction between large and 
small enterprises follows EU/EEA state aid rules. The 
maximum allowable sum (i.e. the sum from which the 
tax deduction is calculated) for R&D projects 
conducted by the enterprise itself, is NOK 4 millions 
per year (about Euro 500 000). In cases where 
enterprises collaborate with an approved R&D 
institution (universities and institutes), the maximum 
sum is NOK 8 millions. Stimulating cooperation 
between academia and commerce is considered an 
important objective of the scheme. 
 
In order to qualify for the scheme, a project must be 
limited and focused, and it must be aimed at 
generating new knowledge, information or experience 
which is presumed to be of use for the enterprise in 
developing new or improved products, services or 
manufacturing/processing methods.  
 
There are no specific constraints or extra incentives 
based on sector or region. Enterprises that are not 
currently liable for taxation also are eligible. If the tax 
credit exceeds the tax payable by the firm, the 
difference is paid to the firm like a negative tax or a 
grant. If the firm is not in a tax position at all, the 
whole amount of the credit is paid to the firm as a 
grant. In practice, this has turned out to be a very 
important feature, as around three-quarters of the total 
support given through the scheme is paid out as grants. 
The payment is made when the tax authorities have 
completed their tax assessment, and takes place the 
year after the actual R&D expenses have occurred. The 
R&D tax credit is thus neutral as between qualifying 
projects, regions, sectors and the tax position of 
qualifying firms, but lowers the marginal cost of R&D 
in small enterprises or low R&D spenders more than in 
larger ones. For firms that would have spent more on 
R&D than the maximum amount in the scheme even 
without the presence of the tax credit, the scheme 
gives no incentive on the margin to increase R&D 
investments, although they have a clear incentive to 
qualify for he scheme and receive the tax deduction  
 
As from the fiscal year 2007, a maximum hourly rate 
and a maximum number of hours per year for in-house 
R&D personnel has been introduced. The ceiling for 
payroll and indirect expenses has been set at NOK 500 
per hour (about 60 Euro). Up to 1850 hours per year 
may be approved per person associated with the 
project. This has made the scheme slightly less 
generous.  
 
The Norwegian Parliament has decided to include 
financial support to unpaid labour in R&D activities in 
the tax credit scheme as well. This way they hope to 
reach high tech entrepreneurs that do not draw wages 
from their firms. The amendment needs to be approved 
by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA).  
 
 
Reports 2007/45 The relationship between the Norwegian R&D 
  13 
General information on firms is collected from 
numerous sources available in Statistics Norway and 
covers the entire population of Norwegian firms: The 
structural statistics, the accounts statistics, the tax 
database, the register of employers and employees and 
the national education database. 
 
Information related to R&D investments and R&D 
subsidies are not available for the entire population of 
firms. Prior to the introduction of SkatteFUNN, 
information on firm level R&D investments are 
available from the R&D statistics collected by Statistics 
Norway every second year up to 2001 and annually 
thereafter. All firms with more than 50 employees are 
included, and a stratified sample of firms with 10-50 
employees5. In 2003 a survey was also conducted on 
firms with less than 10 employees. We use surveys 
from 1993 onwards. 
 
After the introduction of SkatteFUNN, R&D 
information has also been collected by the Research 
Council of Norway among the SkatteFUNN applicants. 
Some of this information covers the years before the 
firms apply for support and before the scheme was 
introduced 
 
There are 17 290 firm year observations in the R&D 
surveys in the years 1993-2001, i.e. prior to 
SkatteFUNN. 26 % of these report positive R&D 
(intramural, extramural or both). After the 
introduction of SkatteFUNN, in the years 2002-2005, 
there are 16 464 firm year observations. Out of these 
33 % report positive R&D and 20 %, 3249 firm year 
observations, have applied for an R&D tax credit. The 
3249 firm year observations that applied for a tax 
credit within the R&D surveys constitute only 24 % of 
the 13 884 firm year R&D tax credit applications in the 
years 2002 to 2005. Of these 13 884 applications, 11 
144, i.e. 80 %, received a tax credit.  
 
Table 3.1 splits firm-year observations that either have 
received an R&D tax credit or have been included in an 
                                                     
5 In 2003 a special survey was done on firms with less than 10 
employees. 
R&D survey on employment groups. As one can easily 
see, firms in the R&D surveys are not a representative 
sample of the SkatteFUNN firms. The SkattteFUNN 
data base is dominated by very small firms while the 
R&D surveys are dominated by medium sized firms. 
 
There are 2598 firm-year observations from 2002 
onwards that report positive R&D without having 
applied for a tax credit6. This is 47% of the firms in the 
R&D surveys with positive R&D. The median R&D for 
firms with positive R&D that do not apply is only half 
of the median R&D for firms with positive R&D that do 
apply. However, average R&D for the two groups is 
about the same, as some of the firms that do not apply 
are very large R&D performers. That the group of non-
applicants contains both very small and very large R&D 
performers seems natural.  
 
There are 254 firm-year observations with a positive 
R&D tax credit that report no R&D in the R&D surveys. 
This suggests that zeros in the R&D surveys are not 
entirely reliable. Some firms may claim to do no R&D 
as a way to minimize time spent on the survey, and 
there may be errors in the processing of the data. 
 
Out of the 11 144 firm year observations with a 
positive R&D tax credit, 70 % had all of the tax credit 
associated with intramural R&D, and 1 % had all of the 
tax credit associated with extramural R&D. Hence, 29 
% had a tax credit associated with both intramural and 
extramural R&D. 18 % reached the tax credit cap for 
intramural R&D and 0.5 % reached the cap for total 
R&D. 7 
                                                     
6 Note that large firms in 2002 were not eligible, but adjusting for 
this does not change the numbers below much. 
7 There are 877 firm-year observations in the R&D surveys that have 
reached the cap for intramural R&D. 261 of these actually report less 
than 4 million in intramural R&D, and 194 report less than 3 million. 
This illustrate that for some firms, the “formula” for calculating R&D 
costs in the SkatteFUNN application is rather generous. There are no 
incidences in the R&D surveys of firms reaching the cap for total 
R&D and reporting less than 8 million in total R&D. Note also that 
there are 300 firm-year observations in the R&D surveys of firms that 
get a tax credit and report more than 4 million in intramural R&D 
without reaching the tax credit cap. 207 of these report more than 5 
million in intramural R&D. 
3. Data 
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Table 3.1. Firm year observations 2002-2005 by data base and number of employees 
Included in the SkatteFUNN database Yes Yes Yes  No No 
Included in the R&D survey  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Positive R&D     Yes No 
No or missing employees 2158 2158 0 1 0 1 
1-9 employees 5786 5700 86 537 62 389 
10-19 employees 2065 1371 694 5204 464 4046 
20-49 employees 2030 1135 895 3927 496 2536 
50-99 employees 952 194 758 2885 548 1579 
100-199 employees 415 31 384 2025 462 1179 
200 or more employees 478 46 432 1885 556 887 
Total 13884 10635 3249 16464 2598 10617 
 
 
In addition to the information of R&D and R&D 
support that is available from the R&D surveys and the 
SkatteFUNN database, we have also utilized 
information from other sources. From the Norwegian 
Research Council’s project database (PROVIS), we have 
extracted information on all applications for direct 
grants in the period 1995-2006. In this study, we use 
information of whether individual firms have applied 
or not in a given year. Similarly, we have used 
information from Innovation Norway’s (and 
predecessors) databases for the years 1995-2006. From 
this, we have constructed dummy variables indicating 
whether firms received any kind of support from 
Innovation Norway in a given year. 
 
See Hægeland et al. (2006), Kjesbu (2006) and 
Cappelen et al (2007a, Appendix B) for more detailed 
information about the various sources and variables. 
Cappelen et al. is written in English, the others in 
Norwegian. 
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Many of the firms that have received R&D subsidies 
through SkatteFUNN have not previously received 
direct R&D subsidies. Having applied for SkatteFUNN, 
and thereby been in touch with Innovation Norway 
and the Research Council, it is possible that these firms 
have become both more motivated to do R&D, and 
become more aware of the possibility of applying for 
direct R&D subsidies. A specific point in the evaluation 
of the SkatteFUNN scheme concerns to what extent 
SkatteFUNN affects firms’ utilisation of other R&D-
stimulating measures. Of particular interest is the 
question of whether SkatteFUNN serves as a low-
threshold measure, stimulating new firms to also make 
use of other measures. In this chapter we investigate 
this hypothesis by trying to answers questions such as 
how SkatteFUNN affects the probability of receiving 
direct subsidies, whether the probability of being in 
contact with the Norwegian Research Council and 
Innovation Norway has changed since SkatteFUNN was 
introduced, and whether being a SkatteFUNN firm 
affects this probability. Finally, we look at whether 
previous support from the Research Council and 
Innovation Norway is associated with the probability of 
receiving support through SkatteFUNN. We utilize 
information in the R&D surveys as well as new data 
sources made available by the Research Council and 
Innovation Norway. Note, however that we face 
serious identification problems when trying to answer 
these simple questions. There is little in our data that 
shed light on what firms that have not previously been 
in touch with the public R&D support system would 
have done if not SkatteFUNN had been introduced. 
4.1. An analysis based on information from 
the R&D surveys 
We start out analyzing the probability of receiving direct 
R&D support using the R&D surveys from 1993 to 2005. 
Before the introduction of SkatteFUNN in 2002 the 
surveys were conducted every second year. The sample 
consists of all firms reporting positive R&D investments. 
We estimate a probit model for the probability of 
receiving direct R&D subsidies. The specification is not 
deducted from a formal economic model, but we control 
for a number of variables known to be related to R&D 
and hence possibly to R&D subsidies. 
Table 4.1. The probability of receiving direct R&D subsidies 
ln(Salest) -0.008* 
 (0.004) 
Sales growth from t-2 to t 0.014* 
 (0.008) 
ln(Intramural R&Dt) 0.043*** 
 (0.005) 
ln(Direct subsidies t-2) 0.023*** 
 (0.002) 
Dummy for post SkatteFUNN year1 -0.162*** 
 (0.016) 
Dummy for receiving an R&D tax credit at t1 0.054** 
 (0.021) 
Dummy for receiving an R&D tax credit at t-11 -0.19 
 (0.16) 
Pseudo R-sq 0.165 
No. of obs. 4041 
The estimation method is probit and the coefficients represent changes in the 
probability of receiving direct R&D subsidies for a one unit change in the 
explanatory variables measured at their means. Industry dummies are included 
but not reported. 
1 Marginals for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
The results are reported in Table 4.1. First, we may 
note that the probability of receiving direct support 
increases with the size of the R&D investments, and 
with the size of direct subsidies received in the 
previous observation period. It also increases with sales 
growth, but decreases with size.  
 
Next, we see that the probability of receiving support is 
significantly lower – both in statistical and economic 
terms – in the years after SkatteFUNN was introduced. 
The estimated effect is -16.2 percent. Firms that 
receive support from SkatteFUNN, however, have a 5.4 
percent higher probability of receiving direct support 
than firms not receiving support from SkatteFUNN. 
One interpretation of these is that SkatteFUNN and 
direct subsidies has been substitutes at the policy level 
while they are complements for individual firms 
seeking public finance for their R&D investments. The 
former is hardly surprising, given that the funding for 
direct R&D subsidies declined somewhat over the 
period when SkatteFUNN was introduced. The latter is 
more interesting, it indicates that the two measures to 
some extent cater to the same firms. 
 
4. How does the R&D tax credit affect 
the probability of receiving other R&D 
and innovation subsidies? 
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Whether the estimated immediate effect of 
SkatteFUNN is causal, in the sense that the 
SkatteFUNN application process leads the firms to seek 
and receive direct subsidies, or whether it is a result of 
selection, in the sense that eligible firms self-select into 
both schemes simultaneously cannot be determined 
econometrically. What we can say is that if there is a 
casual effect it is immediate. We see from the “dummy 
for receiving an R&D tax credit at t-1” that receiving 
SkatteFUNN one year does not increase the probability 
of receiving direct support the year after. Note, 
however, that many SkatteFUNN firms have never 
been included in the R&D surveys, and it is not obvious 
that the firms in the R&D surveys are representative for 
the population of SkatteFUNN firms. In chapter 4.2 we 
perform an analysis on data sets that include all 
recipients of direct subsidies. 
4.2. An analysis based on data from the 
Research Council and Innovation Norway  
In this subsection, we look closer into whether the 
probability of being in contact with the Norwegian 
Research Council and Innovation Norway has changed 
since SkatteFUNN was introduced, and whether being 
a SkatteFUNN firm affects this probability. Finally, we 
look at whether previous support from the Research 
Council and Innovation Norway is associated with the 
probability of receiving support through SkatteFUNN 
 
Data from the project databases from the Norwegian 
Research Council and Innovation Norway and its 
predecessors. The Norwegian Research Council project 
database (PROVIS) contains information on all the 
applications to the Research Council from 1995 to. 
From Innovation Norway and its predecessors, we have 
information on all firms that had received support of 
any kind since 1993. We combine these with 
information from the structural statistics and the 
SkatteFUNN database. This dataset does not have the 
limitations with respect to not including small firms as 
the dataset based on the R&D surveys, but it lacks 
information on R&D investments. In addition, the 
quality of the firm identifiers appears to vary 
somewhat across data sources, so there is some sample 
attrition due to incomplete matching of data sources.  
 
If SkatteFUNN had a large effect on firms’ propensity 
to seek other kinds of support, we should expect to see 
a shift in this propensity at the time of the introduction 
of the scheme. We therefore investigate the probability 
of submitting an application to the Research Council 
and/or receiving support from Innovation Norway, and 
how it has changed over time, conditional on firm 
characteristics. Since the decision process of contacting 
these agencies may be quite different for first-time and 
experienced applicants, we perform the analysis for 
two different samples. The first sample consists of 
those who did not submit an application the previous 
year, while the second sample is those who did. Table 
4.2 shows the estimated effects on probability, while 
table 4.3 presents the corresponding probit estimates. 
Year 2000 is the reference year. We see that there is a 
tendency of a higher persistence among previous 
applicants after the introduction of SkatteFUNN. Those 
who applied to the Research Council or received 
support from Innovation Norway one year, were more 
likely to do sothe next year after the introduction of 
SkatteFUNN. For non-applicants, the probability of 
applying the next year is very low, and there is no 
tendency that the probability increased after the 
introduction of SkatteFUNN. Doing the analysis 
separately for the Norwegian Research Council and 
Innovation Norway (not reported) give very similar 
results. There are no clear signs of a positive shift in 
the “recruitment” of new firms into other support 
measures after the introduction of SkatteFUNN 
 
 
Table 4.2. The probability of submitting application to the 
Norwegian Research Council and/or receiving 
support from Innovation Norway. Reference is year 
2000. Probit marginal effects 
 Did not apply in t-1 Did apply in t-1 
Year 2001 0.009 -0.000*** 
 (0.017) (0.000) 
Year 2002 -0.040** -0.001*** 
 (0.017) (0.000) 
Year 2003 0.043** -0.001*** 
 (0.018) (0.000) 
Year 2004 0.063*** 0.000 
 (0.018) (0.000) 
Log (sales) -0.012*** 0.000*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) 
Log (employment) 0.062*** 0.002*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) 
Observations 6848 838135 
The estimation method is probit and the coefficients represent changes in 
probability for a one unit change in the explanatory variable measured at their 
means. Industry and county dummies are included,but not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 4.3. The probability of submitting application to the 
Norwegian Research Council and/or receiving 
support from Innovation Norway. Reference is year 
2000. Probit coefficients 
 Did apply in t-1 Did not apply in t-1 
Year 2001 0.026 -0.046** 
 (0.049) (0.018) 
Year 2002 -0.120** -0.106*** 
 (0.051) (0.018) 
Year 2003 0.124** -0.100*** 
 (0.050) (0.018) 
Year 2004 0.181*** 0.011 
 (0.051) (0.019) 
Log (sales) -0.036*** 0.023*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) 
Log (employment) 0.181*** 0.210*** 
 (0.018) (0.007) 
Constant -0.650*** -2.989*** 
 (0.090) (0.033) 
Observations 6848 838135 
The estimation method is probit. Industry and county dummies are included, but 
not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Even if there is no increased tendency of new firms 
being in contact with the Norwegian Research Council 
and Innovation Norway, it may still be the case that 
SkatteFUNN firms to a greater extent than other firms 
seek contact with other support agencies. In table 4.4 
we report the results of a probit analysis of the 
probability of contact with the Norwegian Research 
Council (NRC) and/or Innovation Norway (IN) after 
the introduction of SkatteFUNN. We see that those 
who had contact with IN and NRC some time prior to 
SkatteFUNN are more likely to have had such contact 
also after the introduction of SkatteFUNN. In addition, 
being a SkatteFUNN firm increases the probablility of 
such contact. This is hardly surprising, since there is 
some persistence in R&D and innovation activities, and 
firms that seek support for their R&D may tend to try 
multiple sources, and are even encouraged to do so by 
the different agencies. What is more noteworthy, is 
that that the “effect” of SkatteFUNN seems to be larger 
for the firms with no prior contact with IN and/or 
NRC. This may be an indication of SkatteFUNN being a 
“low-threshold measure”, but it may also just reflect 
that for firms with previous contact with IN or NRC the 
possible extra effect of SkatteFUNN is already 
exhausted.  
 
The analysis presented in table 4.5 confirms a plausible 
presumption: Having been in contact with NRC and/or 
IN prior to SkatteFUNN increases the probability of 
applying for support through SkatteFUNN. 
 
 
Table 4.4. The probability of submitting application to the Norwegian Research Council and/or receiving support from Innovation 
Norway after the launching of SkatteFUNN. Marginal effects  
 IN+NRC IN NRC 
Contact with IN+NRC prior to SF 0.132***   
 
(0.006)   
SkatteFUNN firm 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.000* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
SkatteFUNN firm*no contact with IN+NRC prior to SF 0.027***   
 (0.004)   
Contact with IN prior to SF  0.122***  
  (0.006)  
SkatteFUNN firm*no contact with IN prior to SF  0.028***  
  (0.004)  
Contact with NRC prior to SF   0.218*** 
   (0.022) 
SkatteFUNN firm*no contact with NRC prior to SF   0.015*** 
   (0.004) 
Log (sales) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (employmnent) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 220508 220508 220508 
Standard errors in parentheses .The estimation method is probit and the coefficients represent changes in probability for a one unit change in the explanatory variable 
measured at their means. Sales and employment are measured in 2003. Industryand county dummies are included,but not reported. 
• significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 4.5. The probability ofreceiving support from 
SkatteFUNN. Marginal effects 
Contact with NRC prior to SF 0.078*** 
 (0.008) 
Contact with IN prior to SF 0.102*** 
 (0.004) 
Log (sales) 0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
Log (employment) 0.006*** 
 (0.000) 
Observations 220508 
Standard errors in parentheses .The estimation method is probit and the 
coefficients represent changes in probability for a one unit change in the 
explanatory variable measured at their means. Sales and employment are 
measured in 2003. Industryand county dummies are included,but not reported. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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There is a large international literature on the question 
of “additionality” in direct R&D subsidies. Garcia-
Quevedo (2004) does a meta-analysis of 39 studies 
reporting altogether 74 different results, and concludes 
that “The econometric evidence … is ambiguous”. One 
might perhaps argue that the question cannot be 
answered once and for all. Whether subsidies are a 
substitute for or a complement to privately financed 
R&D depends on features of the program analyzed. 
Furthermore, there are several econometric problems 
related to such analyses, see David, Hall and Toole 
(2000) and Jaffe (2002) for surveys. Lichtenberg 
(1984) points out that firm fixed effects are likely to be 
correlated with subsidies, and Kauko (1996) adds to 
this that contemporaneous shocks also could cause a 
bias. The fixed effect will pick up such things as R&D 
experience, networks and experience with the 
application process, technological opportunities in the 
firm’s product group etc. The contemporaneous effect 
could pick up that that firms that get a good idea both 
will apply for a subsidy and perform more R&D than 
previously even without a subsidy. Wallsten (2000) 
explains the basic problem in one sentence: 
“Regressing some measure of innovation on the 
subsidy can establish a correlation between grants and 
R&D, but it cannot determine whether grants increase 
firm R&D or whether firms that do more R&D receive 
more grants”. 
 
Controlling for contemporaneous shocks that may be 
correlated with applying and receiving a subsidy, 
demands some sort of exogenous variation in subsidies 
that is very hard to find. It is beyond the scope of this 
report to fully solve this identification problem. We 
will control for firm fixed effects, but the regressions 
below should be thought of as descriptive regressions 
where the estimated effects are a combination of the 
causal effect of the subsidies and the potential 
contemporaneous selection effects explained above. 
We believe these selection effects are mostly positive 
although in theory they could also be negative.8 Note, 
however, that there are also a potentially important 
                                                     
8 This was proposed by Klette and Møen (1999) when analysing 
Norsk Data and the large IT-programs in the 1980 and 1990s. 
bias working in the opposite direction. R&D is difficult 
to measure, and some firms may not put in enough 
effort in providing good figures when answering the 
R&D surveys. Errors in our explanatory variables will 
bias the estimated coefficients towards zero. 
 
When estimating the additionality of direct R&D 
subsidies, the most common functional form is linear, 
i.e. subsidies in kroner are regressed on R&D in kroner. 
With neither crowding out nor crowding in, each krone 
in subsidy should increase R&D by one krone. With a 
successful matching grant regime, each krone subsidy 
should give two kroner in additional private sector 
R&D. With full crowding out, subsidies will not affect 
R&D investment and hence the estimated coefficient 
will be zero. Full crowding out implies that R&D 
financed by own funds is reduced krone by krone as 
firms receive subsidies. They then use subsidies to 
finance R&D that they otherwise would have financed 
themselves. 
 
Although a linear specification seems most appropriate, 
some studies also use a log-linear functional form (log-
log). The coefficients can then be interpreted as 
elasticities, i.e. a one percent increase in subsidies give 
rise to a constant percentage rise in R&D. There is no 
theoretical justification for this, but it can be thought 
of as a robustness exercise. It will reduce potential 
heteroskedasticity and the influence of potential 
outliers.  
 
We want to compare the additionality of subsidies 
given as direct grants with the R&D tax credit 
introduced in 2002. The choice of functional form then 
becomes more complicated, and to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies in the international 
literature that attempts to make such a comparison.  
 
The preferred theoretical framework for estimating the 
effect of a tax credit is a demand equation with the tax 
credit generating variation in the price of R&D.In a 
companion report, Hægeland and Møen (2007), we 
give a thorough discussion of different approaches and 
identification problems in light of the design of the 
Norwegian tax credit scheme. A loglinear functional 
5. The additionality of direct R&D 
subsidies vs SkatteFUNN 
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form is usually recommended (Hall and van Reenen, 
2000). However, theory does not predict a certain 
relationship between the size of the tax credit – 
whether in kroner or log of kroner – and R&D. A firm 
that is induced by the tax credit to do a small 
SkatteFUNN project and receive 20 percent of this as a 
tax credit, will have an additionality of 5, a firm that 
does R&D well above the 4 million cap will receive 
720 000 or 800 000 in tax credit, but has no 
additionality at all in absence of liquidity constraints or 
internal political processes related to the investment 
budget.9 Nonetheless, by including the size of the tax 
credit as a regressor alongside direct subsidies, we can 
as a descriptive exercise estimate the average 
additionality for the firms in the sample. Once again, 
we should stress that this is not a causal effect. It will 
be a mix of the average true additionality and potential 
selection effects.  
 
Since firms that would invest above the cap in absence 
of SkatteFUNN do not have a direct incentive to 
increase their R&D investments, we follow Hægeland 
and Møen (2007) and interact SkatteFUNN with a 
dummy for whether or not the firms’ mean investment 
level prior to SkatteFUNN was below the cap. We use 
the firms’ average investment level prior to 
SkatteFUNN to proxy whether firms would invest 
above or below the cap after SkatteFUNN was 
introduced. The difference between firms above and 
below the cap is likely to be less biased than the 
absolute increase for each of the groups. Implicitly, this 
means that we use firms above the cap to tell us what 
the firms below the cap would have invested in 
absence of the tax credit. To the extent that firms 
above the cap also have some additionality, this causes 
a downward bias. Moreover, there is no way we can 
know which firms would be above or below the cap in 
absence of SkatteFUNN. Using a proxy based on 
historical R&D investments causes some 
misclassifications and this will also lead to a downward 
bias as we contaminate the treatment and the control 
groups. We refer to Hægeland and Møen (2007) for a 
more thorough discussion. 
 
5.1. Average additionality for direct subsidies 
Since theory cannot guide us with respect to the choice 
of functional form, we will estimate both linear and 
log-linear relations. Our main estimates can be found 
in table 5.1. The analysis is restricted to intramural 
R&D, as information on subsidies for extramural R&D 
has not been collected systematically in the R&D 
surveys. 
 
Taken at face value, the regression on the full sample 
in column (1) tells us that firms below the cap on 
average increase their R&D by 2.68 kroner per krone in 
                                                     
9 “Well above” to account for the possibility that firms with R&D just 
above the cap would have been below the cap in absence of the tax 
credit. 
tax credit received when entering SkatteFUNN. As 
pointed out above, to what extent this is due to the tax 
credit or to the firms self selecting into SkatteFUNN 
when planning to increase their R&D investments 
cannot be determined. To the extent that the selection 
process is the same for firms above and below the cap, 
this is accounted for in the 1.35 additionality estimate 
for firms above the cap. However, as discussed in 
Hægeland and Møen (2007), the assumption of equal 
selection process above and below the cap is not 
obvious. It may be the case that firms doing little R&D 
but planning to increase R&D investment are more 
likely to self-select into the scheme than firms doing a 
lot of R&D. This will contribute to bias our addition-
ality estimates upward. On the other hand, if not all of 
the 1.35 additionality estimate for firms above the cap 
is driven by selection and unobserved macroeconomic 
conditions, the true additionality for firms below the 
cap will be larger as the total increase in R&D for this 
group is the sum of the two coefficients. Moreover, 
various measurement problems pointed out above also 
suggest that 1.35 is more likely to be a conservative 
than a generous estimate. 
 
 
Table 5.1. The effect of the tax credit and direct subsidies on 
R&D investments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All firms All firms SME Large firms
Tax credit 1.35 1.07 0.49 1.77
  (0.89) (0.86) (1.16) (1.29)
Tax credit * 
Below 4 mill 2.68*** 3.04*** 3.22** 2.69**
  (0.96) (0.93) (1.32) (1.33)
Direct 
subsidies 1.18*** 1.05*** 0.72*** 1.66***
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.11) (0.35)
Direct 
subsidies * 
Below 4 mill 0.58** 0.53** 0.27
  (0.29) (0.22) (0.43)
ln(Sales) 788.99*** 1700.05*** 1876.32*** 1584.92***
  (170.36) (477.05) (602.53) (590.66)
ln(Sales) * 
Below 4 mill -1356.70*** -1583.01*** -1236.55**
  (482.42) (612.53) (598.37)
Adj.R-sq 
(within) 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.10
No. of obs. 8233 8233 3803 4430
The dependent variable is intramural R&D. All variables are measured in real 
NOK. All regressions include firm fixed effects. The sample consist of firms that 
have reported positive R&D in at least one year before 2002 and that has never 
reported R&D above 40 mill. Firms are included in the sample up until the first 
year they receive an R&D tax credit. Time dummies are included, but not 
reported. Huber-White robust standard errors allowing for clustering of errors by 
firms are reported in parenthesis. “Below 4 mill” is a dummy for firms’ mean 
level of real intramural R&D investments prior to the introduction of SkatteFUNN 
in 2002 being below the 4 million cap.  
*** Significant at the 1 % level** Significant at the 5 % level* Significant at the 
10 % level 
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The estimated average association between direct R&D 
subsidies and firms’ R&D investments are somewhat 
smaller. Our overall estimate is 1.18. In column (2)-(4) 
we allow for heterogeneity between small and large 
R&D performers as measured by being above or below 
the 4 million tax credit cap. We see from column (2) 
that firms that on average invested more than 4 million 
in R&D prior to 2002 do 1.05 krone more R&D than 
“usual” in years when they receive one krone more in 
direct subsidy than “usual”. (“Usual” meaning the firm 
specific average over time that is the base line in a 
fixed effects regression.) Firms that used to invest less 
than 4 million have higher additionality, 
1.05+0.58=1.63. Potential selection suggests that this 
estimate may be too high, while possible measurement 
error in the direct subsidy variable may cause a 
downward bias. However, the estimated effect is so 
large and significant that it seems reasonable to 
conclude that direct subsidies have a fairly high degree 
of additionality for small R&D performers (firms below 
4 million prior to 2002). The degree of additionality 
for larger R&D performers (above 4 million) also 
seems acceptable, since the point estimate is slightly 
above 1. An additionality of one implies that the 
subsidy is spent on R&D krone by krone.  
 
Even if the estimated additionality of direct subsidies is 
smaller than the estimated additionality of the tax 
credit, the estimated coefficients suggests that the 
direct subsidy regime works well. One would expect 
that the average externality associated with projects 
chosen by grant awarding public agencies are larger 
than the average externality associated with project 
qualifying for the tax credit. The latter projects are 
chosen by the firms solely based on expected private 
return. Recall also that the estimated additionality for 
the tax credit is for firms below the 4 million cap. 
Hence the average additionality for all firms will be 
substantially smaller, as firms above the cap have little 
incentive to increase their R&D in response to the tax 
credit. 
 
In column (3) and (4) the firms in the sample are split 
in two groups according to size. We do this primarily 
to explore whether small and medium-sized firms have 
a different degree of additionality than large firms, but 
the exercise may also be considered a robustness 
check. Small and medium sized firms (enterprises) – 
SMEs – are defined according to the 2002 SkatteFUNN 
rules, see section 2.2.  
 
To take the robustness perspective first, we see that 
significant and positive additionality can be found in 
both subsamples and for both types of subsidies. 
Looking more in detail, we see that the additionality 
associated with the tax credit is somewhat larger for 
SMEs (3.22) than for larger firms (2.69). This is 
reasonable, as small firms are more likely to be 
liquidity constrained and the subsidy matters more to 
the profitability of small firms than large firms. With 
respect to the additionality of direct R&D subsidies we 
see that the difference between small and large R&D 
performers found in column (2) is driven by the SME 
group. Small R&D intensive firms exibit less 
additionality (0.72) than other small 
firms(0.72+0.53=1.25) and large firms. Given fairly 
large adjustment costs, it may be rational for small 
firms with R&D as a main focus not to scale their R&D 
investments up and down based on annual public 
grants quite as much as less R&D intensive firms. It is 
still possible that reduced subsidies to this group of 
firms would have long term effects on their level of 
R&D investments. In this report we restrict ourselves to 
analyse short term additionality. Long run effects are 
far more difficult to assess. 
 
In table 5.2 we check the robustness of our findings 
above by using a log-log functional form. The 
coefficients are then elasticities, i.e. the percentage 
change in R&D associated with a one percentage 
change in subsidies and tax credits. Taking logs will 
also tend to reduce the influence of the largest R&D 
performers in the sample. Consistent with this, we see 
that the main difference from table 5.1 is that the 
estimated difference between small and large R&D 
performers is somewhat smaller in relative terms – 
although still highly significant. We also see that the 
difference between SMEs and large firms is much less 
noticeable. Finally, this analysis suggests that the 
additionality effects of direct subsidies and tax credits 
are of similar magnitude. 
 
 
Table 5.2. The effect of the tax credit and direct subsidies on 
R&D investments – loglinear specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All firms All firms  SME Large 
firms
ln(Tax credit)  0.190*** 0.162*** 0.198*** 0.156***
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.037) (0.040)
ln(Tax credit) * Below 
4 mill  0.298*** 0.329*** 0.296*** 0.368***
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.045)
ln(Direct subsidies)  0.360*** 0.222*** 0.149*** 0.267***
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.046) (0.044)
ln(Direct subsidies) * 
Below 4 mill  0.230*** 0.277*** 0.203***
  (0.042) (0.059) (0.058)
ln(Sales)  0.329*** 0.443**  0.661** 0.348
 (0.114) (0.204) (0.261) (0.253)
ln(Sales) * Below 4 mill   -0.125  -0.195  -0.096
  (0.244) (0.322) (0.302)
Adj.R-sq (within)  0.13 0.13 0.17 0.12
No. of obs.  8233 8233 3803 4430
The dependent variable is log of intramural R&D in real NOK. All regressions 
include firm fixed effects. The sample consist of firms that have reported positive 
R&D in at least one year before 2002 and that has never reported R&D above 40 
mill. Firms are included in the sample up until the first year they receive an R&D 
tax credit. Time dummies are included, but not reported. Huber-White robust 
standard errors allowing for clustering of errors by firms are reported in 
parenthesis. “Below 4 mill” is a dummy for firms’ mean level of real intramural 
R&D investments prior to the introduction of SkatteFUNN in 2002 being below 
the cap, 4 million NOK.  
*** Significant at the 1 % level** Significant at the 5 % level* Significant at the 
10 % level 
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5.2. Additionality for direct subsidies by 
source 
The variable direct subsidies comprises subsidies from 
several different sources. In table 5.3 and 5.4 we 
include subsidies from the various sources as separate 
variables, hence asking whether the degree of 
additionality vary between different types of public 
funds. This is to be expected, as the required own 
funding in projects vary systematically between the 
various agencies that give support to private R&D. 
 
From Table 5.3, we see that funding from the Research 
Council have the highest degree of additionality, with a 
coefficient around 2. The estimated effect is slightly 
larger for large than for small R&D performers, and 
slightly larger for large firms than for SMEs. These 
differences are not significant, and overall, the results 
are quite consistent with a successful matching grant 
regime. A competing explanation, however,could be 
that firms turn to the Research Council in years when 
they have particularly good projects and that they 
would increase their R&D even without support.  
 
The estimated additionality for support from Innova-
tion Norway is 1.53. Here, large firms seem to have 
higher additionality than SMEs. This is slightly 
surpriseing as one would think that increasing the R&D 
intensity of SMEs is a particularly important target for 
Innovation Norway. 
 
R&D subsidies awarded through ministries (including 
support from directorates, counties, municipalities and 
other unspecified public agencies) have lower 
additionality than R&D grants from other sources. The 
overall estimate is 0.64. The additionality seem to vary 
quite a bit between different types of firms, but the 
precision of the estimates are fairly low. It seems that 
small R&D performers have higher additionality than 
large R&D performers, and the additionality for large 
firms with R&D investments above 4 millions seems 
close to zero.  
 
R&D support from ministries and other public agencies 
outside the Research Council and Innovation Norway is 
likely to be contract research. Hence there is no a priori 
reason to expect a high degree of additionality here. 
Still, coefficients significantly below 1 may at first 
glance seem suspicious. This implies that the firms’ 
R&D budgets increase with less than what they receive. 
On second thought, however, this need not be 
illegitimate in a contract research setting. It may reflect 
that the firms do not have capacity to do a large R&D 
contract on top of what they otherwise would have 
done, and that the contracts therefore crowd out other 
projects. The ministries may still get what they pay for. 
 
 
Table 5.3. The effect of the tax credit and direct subsidies on R&D investments, by source  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
 All firms All firms SME Large firms
Tax credit 1.46* 1.24 0.54 1.90
  (0.85)  (0.82)  (1.09)  (1.27)
Tax credit * Below 4 mill 2.55*** 2.79*** 3.08** 2.55*
  (0.93)  (0.90)  (1.26)  (1.31)
Direct subsidies from  
  
The Research Council 2.07*** 2.04*** 1.69*** 2.18***
  (0.34)  (0.42)  (0.35)  (0.60)
The Research Council * Below 4 mill -0.21
(0.46)
-0.12 
(0.45) 
-0.14
(0.66)
Innovation Norway 1.53*** 1.38*** 0.52** 1.96***
  (0.35)  (0.49)  (0.26)  (0.65)
Innovation Norway * Below 4 mill 0.28
(0.60)
0.48 
(0.48) 
0.04
(0.76)
  
Ministries 0.64*** 0.52 0.49 0.01
  (0.24)  (0.32)  (0.37)  (0.55)
Ministries * Below 4 mill 0.77** 0.77** 1.26*
  (0.36)  (0.37)  (0.72)
EU 0.75*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.95*
  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.57)
EU * Below 4 mill 1.56* 1.84 1.05
  (0.92)  (1.21)  (1.42)
ln(Sales) 760.91*** 1608.70*** 1751.88*** 1531.10***
 (170.47) (473.81) (620.06) (587.36)
ln(Sales) * Below 4 mill -1271.24*** -1450.51** -1186.28** 
 (479.42) (631.01) (594.96)
Adj.R-sq (within) 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.10
No. of obs. 8104 8104 3724 4380
The dependent variable is intramural R&D. All variables are measured in real NOK. All regressions include firm fixed effects. The sample consist of firms that have 
reported positive R&D in at least one year before 2002 and that has never reported R&D above 40 mill. Firms are included in the sample up until the first year they 
receive an R&D tax credit. Time dummies are included, but not reported. Huber-White robust standard errors allowing for clustering of errors by firms are reported in 
parenthesis. “Below 4 mill” is a dummy for firms’ mean level of real intramural R&D investments prior to the introduction of SkatteFUNN in 2002 being below the cap, 
4 million NOK. *** Significant at the 1 % level** Significant at the 5 % level* Significant at the 10 % level 
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Table 5.4. The effect of the tax credit and direct subsidies on R&D investments, by source – loglinear specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
 All firms All firms SME Large firms
ln(Tax credit) 0.181*** 0.160*** 0.193*** 0.156***
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.039)
ln(Tax credit) * Below 4 mill 0.314*** 0.340*** 0.304*** 0.381***
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.042) (0.045)
ln(Direct subsidies) from  
  
The Research Council 0.296*** 0.178*** 0.081* 0.231***
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.045) (0.046)
The Research Council * Below 4 mill 0.225*** 0.287*** 0.203***
 (0.051) (0.069) (0.067)
Innovation Norway 0.296*** 0.186*** 0.163*** 0.222***
 (0.030) (0.049) (0.054) (0.073)
Innovation Norway * Below 4 mill 0.177*** 0.170**  0.159*
 (0.062) (0.074) (0.092)
Ministries 0.210*** 0.123*** 0.092* 0.158***
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.055) (0.059)
Ministries * Below 4 mill 0.168** 0.177 0.159
 (0.077) (0.109) (0.103)
EU 0.066 0.034 0.089  -0.021
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.061) (0.059)
EU * Below 4 mill 0.138 0.121 0.141
 (0.113) (0.158) (0.162)
ln(Sales) 0.346*** 0.447** 0.613**  0.344
 (0.116) (0.210) (0.274) (0.261)
ln(Sales) * Below 4 mill  -0.103  -0.068  -0.090
 (0.250) (0.337) (0.309)
Adj.R-sq (within) 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.11
No. of obs. 8104 8104 3724 4380
The dependent variable is log of intramural R&D in real NOK. All regressions include firm fixed effects. The sample consist of firms that have reported positive R&D in at 
least one year before 2002 and that has never reported R&D above 40 mill. Firms are included in the sample up until the first year they receive an R&D tax credit. Time 
dummies are included, but not reported. Huber-White robust standard errors allowing for clustering of errors by firms are reported in parenthesis. “Below 4 mill” is a 
dummy for firms’ mean level of real intramural R&D investments prior to the introduction of SkatteFUNN in 2002 being below the cap, 4 million NOK.  
*** Significant at the 1 % level** Significant at the 5 % level* Significant at the 10 % level 
 
 
The final type of R&D support specified is support 
awarded through the EU system. The overall estimate is 
fairly modest, 0.75, but this seems to be driven mostly 
by large R&D performers. Small R&D performers have a 
high degree of additionality, 0.67+1.56=2.23. 
However, there could be a substantial selection bias 
involved in this estimate, as it is likely to be very difficult 
for small R&D performers to succeed in the EU system. 
 
In table 5.4 we redo the above analysis using a log-log 
functional form. This specification suggests that small 
R&D performers have a higher degree of additionality, 
as measured in elasticities than large R&D performers 
for all types of direct subsidies.  
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Both direct grants and tax credits are policy tools to 
induce private R&D projects that would not be under-
taken without a subsidy. As we have discussed in the 
introduction, they differ with respect to how projects are 
selected. Direct subsidy programs have public agencies 
involved in choosing the R&D projects that receive 
financing. Their aim is to select projects with large 
externalities that would not have been undertaken 
without the subsidy, i.e. projects that have a low private 
return. A tax credit, on the other hand has no such 
selection process attached to it, hence firms will rank 
projects according to their private return. Much of the 
subsidy will then be paid to inframarginal projects that 
would be undertaken even without a subsidy, i.e. 
projects with a high private return. The mechanism 
utilized by the government is simply to induce more R&D 
by lowering the marginal price. If the different subsidy 
schemes work according to “theory”, projects should 
differ with respect to private returns depending on their 
source of financing. In this section, we aim to estimate 
the private return to R&D and distinguish between R&D 
that firms finance by own funds, R&D financed by direct 
grants, and R&D financed by tax credits.  
 
6.2. A standard framework for estimating 
returns to R&D 
We build on the R&D capital model laid out e.g. in 
Griliches (1973, 1979 and 2000). Variations of this 
framework are widely used in studies of the return to 
R&D, see Mairesse and Sassenou (1991) and Wieser 
(2005) for good reviews of the methodological and 
empirical literature. 10 
 
We assume that firms’ technology can be described by 
an extended Cobb-Douglas production function with 
                                                     
10 The variations stem from whether to use total production, value 
added, TFP, “partial productivity” or labour productivity as left hand 
side variables, whether to use the knowledge capital stocks or the R&D 
intensity as the key right hand side variable, whether to impose 
constant return to scale in traditional inputs, whether to estimate 
equations in levels or first differences, the level of aggregation, what 
additional control variables to include, whether and how to handle 
simultaneity between input choice and production, whether to correct 
for double counting of inputs used for R&D, estimation method, etc.  
constant returns to scale in the conventional inputs, 
labour, material and physical capital. 
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where Qit is output measured by total 
operational income (sales) 
Lit is labour measured by total man hours
11 
Mit is materials 
Cit is services from physical capital 
 
Kit is knowledge capital (R&D capital), the variable of 
key interest in our analysis.  
 
β, γ and φ are elasticities, and αiεit is a random 
disturbance term. αi could e.g. account for unobserved 
variation in the quality of labour between firms. 
 
Taking logs of (1) we get 
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Taking first differences of (2), we get 
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Small letters represent log differences or growth rates so 
that e.g. 
it
it
ititit Q
Q
QQq
Δ
≈−=
−1lnln . uit is the first 
difference of (αi+εit). Note that the firm fixed (level) 
effect, αi is differenced out of the transformed error term. 
                                                     
11 R&D man hours should have been subtracted to avoid double 
counting of R&D inputs. It seems, however, that such an adjustment 
creates substantial noise in our TFP measure due to measurement 
errors in the available R&D man year variable. According to Wieser 
(2005), lack of double counting causes a downward bias in the rate 
of return to R&D estimates. This is probably more important for 
estimates based on level equations than on growth equations where 
unobserved firm fixed effects are differenced out. 
6. The profitability of R&D financed by 
direct subsidies vs R&D financed by 
SkatteFUNN 
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If we assume perfect competition, the elasticity of 
labour is 
itt
itt
QP
Lw
=β  where wt is the wage rate, and Pt 
can be normalized to 1 since Qt is measured by sales.
12 
We can then calculate βˆ  as the firms’ wage share in 
output. Likewise, γˆ  can be calculated as the firms’ 
share of material costs in output. This makes it possible 
to rewrite equation (3) in TFP growth  
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where tfp is the log difference of TFP and 
ititititit CMLQTFP ln)ˆˆ1(lnˆlnˆlnln γβγβ −−−−−≡ . 
 
When calculating the elasticities, we allow them to 
vary between firms, but assume that they are positive 
and fixed within firms over time. 
 
Next, if we assume that the returns to knowledge 
capital, ρ∂
∂
=
it
it
K
Q
 is equated across firms, we can 
rewrite (4) as  
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If knowledge capital depreciates slowly and knowledge 
accumulates additively, we have that 11 −− ≈Δ itit RK  
where Rit-1 represents total R&D investments in the 
previous period. This gives us the following 
relationship where the returns to R&D, ρ, can be 
estimated directly without calculating the knowledge 
capital stock  
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Rit/Qit is known as “research intensity”. Not having to 
calculate the knowledge capital stock is beneficial since 
long time series of the firms’ R&D investments typically 
are unavailable.  
 
As we have indicated in footnote 10, 12 and 
throughout, there are many potential pitfalls in the 
framework leading up to equation (6). Even though ρ 
                                                     
12 It is within this framework common to approximate elasticities 
with factor shares, but in the context of a model with R&D 
investments, perfect competition is obviously a rough, simplifying 
assumption. See Griliches (2000) p. 63-65 for a short discussion. 
According to Griliches, building on Klette and Griliches (1996), 
market power may lead to a downward bias of the estimated effect 
of R&D on productivity. 
clearly tells us something about the effect of R&D on 
firm performance, its interpretation as “rate of return” 
should not be taken entirely literally. See e.g. Mairesse 
and Sassenou (1991) for a discussion of difficulties 
with this interpretation. 
 
6.3. Extending the framework to allow for 
different types of R&D 
We want to estimate the returns to different types of 
R&D separately. This suggests that we need to decom-
pose the knowledge capital stock. We have assumed that 
the knowledge accumulation process is additive, i.e. 
 
(7) ititit RKK +−= −1)1( δ  
 
R&D consists of different types of projects. Let us for 
know abstract from projects that receive R&D tax credits 
and focus on pure private funding and direct public 
grants. Theory predicts that projects financed by public 
grants are less efficient in building productive know-
ledge for the firm (in terms of generating private return) 
than projects that the firms undertake without subsidies. 
 
Let us therefore distinguish between unweighted 
knowledge capital, K and efficient knowledge capital 
K*. Let  
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P represents privately financed knowledge capital and 
G represents knowledge capital financed by grants 
from the government. We assume that both the private 
and governmental part of the knowledge capital 
accumulates according to (7). 
 
The efficient knowledge capital is unobserved as the 
efficiency weight (1+π) is unknown. However, if π is 
different from zero, equations (1) – (6) are misspeci-
fied. Taking the loglinear production function (2) as 
our point of departure, we find that the following term 
is missing 
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Hence one possible solution is to include as a variable 
the ratio between the knowledge capital that is 
financed by the government and the total unweighted 
knowledge capital. This is the approach suggested by 
Griliches (1986). It makes it possible to estimate the 
efficiency parameter π by taking the ratio of the 
estimates for φπ and φ. 
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Note, however, that (9) involves an approximation, 
and that this approximation is only good for 
it
G
it
K
Kπ
close 
to zero. Furthermore, in order to make the correction 
term in (9), knowledge stocks based on both total R&D 
and governmental R&D must be calculated. 
 
An alternative avenue, not explored by Griliches 
(1986), is to go back to equation (5). Substituting 
efficient knowledge capital for unweighted knowledge 
capital we get  
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Next, we have that 
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Inserted in (10) this gives us 
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The expressions for ρ  og ρ(1+π) follows from  
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The coefficients, ρ and ρ(1+π), therefore can be 
interpretated as the returns to private and 
governmental knowledge capital respectively. If we 
again assume a low rate of depreciation so that 
P
it
P
it RK 11 −− ≈Δ  and 
G
it
G
it RK 11 −− ≈Δ , we can estimate (12) 
by using R&D intensities rather than knowledge capital 
stocks: 
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So far we have for simplicity abstracted from R&D 
projects that receive tax credits. The framework we have 
developed, however, is easy to generalize to an arbitrary 
number of knowledge capital components. Let the 
knowledge capital built up on R&D projects that receive 
an R&D tax credit be KT. Let its efficiency relative to 
privately financed knowledge capital be (1+τ). Then 
 
(16) Tit
G
it
P
itit KKKK ++= ,  
 
(17) Tit
G
itit
T
it
G
it
P
itit KKKKKKK τπτπ ++=++++= )1()1(
*  
and 
 
(18) Tit
G
it
P
it KKKK it Δ++Δ++Δ=Δ )1()1(
* τπ  
 
The equation to be estimated is then 
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In the empirical application, we add time dummies, 
industry dummies and a dummy for firms that report 
zero R&D. We will also allow uit to have a firm specific 
random component. 
 
6.4. Data 
Our sample consists at the outset of all observations in 
the Norwegian R&D surveys from 1993 to 2005. We 
merge these data with Statistics Norway’s “firm capital 
database” that has detailed information on output and 
inputs for manufacturing firms. This database is docu-
mented in Raknerud, Rønningen and Skjerpen (2004, 
2007) and Raknerud and Rønningen (2004). We 
remove observations with missing variables and 
outliers defined as observations with R&D-intensities 
large than 0.5 and TFP-growth (log difference) outside 
the ±50 % interval. These two trimming criteria 
remove about 2.5 % of the sample. 
 
We assume that direct subsidies are given as matching 
grants and calculate RG, R&D projects financed by public 
grants, as two times the grant. RT is measured as the size 
of the R&D project accepted under the tax credit scheme, 
i.e. about five times the actual tax credit given that the 
project does not exceed the maximum amount liable for 
deduction. R&D projects financed by own funding is 
calculated as total R&D minus the two other components.  
 
6.5. Results 
We start out estimating equation (6) giving the overall 
return to R&D. The results are reported in table 6.1, 
column (1). Our overall estimate suggests a 15 % gross 
private return to R&D investments. This estimate 
seems low. R&D investments should earn a risk 
premium and “gross” means that depreciation is not 
accounted for (assumed to be zero).13 Measurement 
                                                     
13 Depreciation of the existing knowledge capital stock has to be 
deducted before the “net” return can be calculated. Depreciation of the 
private stock of knowledge capital is commonly assumed to be 15 %. 
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errors in the R&D variable are likely to give a down-
ward bias, however, and our estimate is in line with 
the international literature and previous work on 
Norwegian data, see the next section.  
 
In table 6.1, column (2)-(5), we explore whether the 
return varies with two measures of firm size. This can 
also be thought of as a robustness exercise as it shows 
the stability of the results across different subsamples. 
All samples give reasonable estimates. We find that 
SMEs and firms with pre SkatteFUNN R&D below 4 
million have somewhat higher returns to R&D than 
larger firms.14 
 
Our aim is to estimate the returns to R&D funded by 
direct subsidies and tax credits. Before turning to the 
framework developed in section 6.2 we explore this 
issue by using a simple dummy approach. In table 6.2, 
column (1), we see that interaction terms between 
R&D intensity and dummies for receiving direct 
subsidies and/or tax credits suggest that the return to 
R&D in firms that use the tax credits scheme is higher 
than the return to R&D in firms that receive direct R&D 
subsidies – at least for firms with high R&D intensity. 
The results in column (2)-(5) show that the basic 
pattern found in column (1) is fairly robust to various 
ways of splitting the sample. 
 
Estimates based on our main specification in equation 
(19) are given in table 6.3. The pattern found in table 
6.2 is confirmed. Our estimate for the return to R&D 
projects financed by direct subsidies is not significantly 
different from zero and the point estimate is actually 
negative. Our estimate for the return to R&D projects 
financed by tax credits is just slightly below the return 
to R&D projects financed by own funds. Although the 
estimated return to projects financed by direct 
subsidies is surprisingly low, the basic pattern fits the 
predictions given in section 5.1. R&D subsidies are 
given to projects with low private returns while 
projects that receive an R&D tax credit are quite 
similar to projects financed by own means, but have 
slightly lower returns. Remember that the key success 
criteria for projects financed by direct subsidies are 
their social returns which we do not estimate.  
 
Turning to table 6.3, column (2)-(5), we find that the 
estimated pattern is quite robust to splitting the sample 
according to firm size. The estimated returns are 
however, not stable over time. When estimating the 
return parameters year by year from 1993 to 2005, 
they vary considerably. This may suggest a problem 
with the specification, but it may as well reflect a 
reality with large variance in the returns to R&D 
projects. Typically, a few projects are major successes 
while most projects have a low or negative return, see 
e.g. Scherer and Harhoff (2000). Cappelen, Raknerud 
                                                     
14 SMEs are defined according to the 2002 SkatteFUNN rules. 
and Rybalka (2007b) document that this is the case 
also for firms receiving SkatteFUNN-subsidies.  
 
 
Table 6.1. Returns to R&D investments in Norway 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All firms SME Large 
firms 
Below 4 
million
Above 4 
million
R&Dt-1/Salest-1 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.11***
  (0.03) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R-square 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
No. of obs. 12081 7544 4537 9646 2435
The dependent variable is TFP-growth measured by log differences. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. The estimation method is GLS with firm random effects in the 
error term. A dummy for zero R&D, time dummies and 30 industry dummies are 
included, but not reported. Below and above 4 million refers to average intramural 
R&D being above or below the 4 million cap before the tax credit scheme was 
introduced. The sample consists of observations in the R&D surveys from 1993 to 
2005. Outliers, defined as observations with R&D-intensities large than 0.5 and TFP-
growth outside the ±50 % interval, are removed. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 6.2. Returns to R&D by source of funding – interaction 
terms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All firms SME Large 
firms 
Below 4 
million
Above 4 
million
R&Dt-1/Salest-1 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.11* 0.11*
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Dummy for 
direct 
subsidiest-1 
0.01*
(0.01)
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Dummy for tax 
creditt-1 
 -0.01**
(0.00)
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.02***
(0.01)
R&Dt-1/Salest-1   
 * Dummy for 
direct 
subsidiest-1 
 -0.10*
(0.06)
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.16** 
(0.08)  
-0.10
(0.09)
-0.10
(0.08)
R&Dt-1/Salest-1   
 * Dummy for  0.12** 0.15**  -0.06 0.17** 0.12
tax creditt-1 (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
R-square 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05
No. of obs.  12081 7544 4537 9646 2435
The dependent variable is TFP-growth measured by log differences. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. The estimation method is GLS with firm random effects in the 
error term. A dummy for zero R&D, time dummies and 30 industry dummies are 
included, but not reported. Below and above 4 million refers to average intramural 
R&D being above or below the 4 million cap before the tax credit scheme was 
introduced. The sample consists of observations in the R&D surveys from 1993 to 
2005. Outliers, defined as observations with R&D-intensities large than 0.5 and TFP-
growth outside the ±50 % interval, are removed. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6.3. Returns to R&D by source of funding - intensities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All firms SME Large 
firms 
Below 4 
million
Above 4 
million
R&DOwn funding/Sales 0.19*** 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.16***
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
R&DDirect subsidies/Sales -0.09 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14*
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08)
R&DTax credit/Sales 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17 0.19*** 0.12** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06)
R-square 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05
No. of obs. 12081 7544 4537 9646 2435
The dependent variable is TFP-growth measured by log differences. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. The estimation method is GLS with firm random effects in the 
error term. A dummy for zero R&D, time dummies and 30 industry dummies are 
included, but not reported. Below and above 4 million refers to average intramural 
R&D being above or below the 4 million cap before the tax credit scheme was 
introduced. The sample consists of observations in the R&D surveys from 1993 to 
2005. Outliers, defined as observations with R&D-intensities large than 0.5 and TFP-
growth outside the ±50 % interval, are removed. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level** Significant at the 5 percent level*** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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6.6. Previous estimates of the returns to R&D 
There is a large international literature on the returns 
to R&D. Good surveys are provided byMairesse and 
Sassenou (1991), Griliches (2000), and Wieser (2005) 
performing a meta-analysis. Wieser concludes that 
there is “a large and significant impact of R&D on firm 
performance on average. However, the estimated 
returns vary considerably across studies”.In the meta-
analysis, he finds that “the estimated rates of return do 
not significantly differ between countries”.  
 
Taking the average over 32 studies with significant 
direct estimates of the rate of return to R&D, Wieser 
finds a private rate of return to R&D of 28 % with a 
standard deviation of 13 %. The corresponding results 
we have presented based on Norwegian data, 15 %, is 
therefore on the low side, but no means unusual. The 
significant estimates presented by Wieser range from 
7% to 69 %. Including insignificant results, the average 
return is 16 % and the lowest estimate is –55%. 
 
The most important previous study using Norwegian 
data is Klette and Johansen (1998). They analyse a 
panel of manufacturing plants with data from 1980 to 
1992. They measure R&D at the line-of-business level 
within firms, and present estimates based on several 
specifications. When using the Griliches R&D-capital 
framework that we base our analysis on, they get gross 
rate of return estimates ranging from –17% to 51%, 
depending on the specification. The mean and median 
values across their 17 estimates are 12 % and 6 % 
respectively. The specification most similar to what we 
use in table 6.1 gives an estimated rate of return that is 
very close to zero. Their preferred estimate is, 
however, based on an alternative framework with a 
multiplicative knowledge capital accumulation 
function replacing equation (7) above. Their basic 
premise is that new R&D investments and the previous 
stock of knowledge are complements, meaning that the 
more you already know, the more new knowledge you 
can generate with a given R&D effort. Based on a 
model incorporating this idea, they find a net return to 
R&D around 9 percent, and that the depreciation rate 
from a private point of view is 15-18 percent. Their 
finding implies a rate of return to R&D that is quite 
close to estimates for the rate of return to physical 
capital investments.  
 
We are not aware of any studies that compare the 
returns to different types of public R&D subsidies. Our 
framework in section 6.3, build on Griliches (1986) 
who compares the returns to commercial R&D with 
private and public funding. In line with our results, he 
finds a large premium on privately financed R&D. His 
estimates imply that privately financed R&D has a rate 
of return that is 50 to 180 percent large than the rate 
of return to publicly financed R&D. 
 
On Norwegian data, Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka 
(2007a) analyse the effect of R&D financed by 
SkatteFUNN on firm productivity. Their study is part of 
the same evaluation program as our report. We 
complement their analysis in that our focus is on the 
relative merit of the tax credit vs. direct subsidies. 
There are also other differences. Cappelen et al. 
explore several specifications. Some of them are closely 
related to our framework, but some of them are 
econometrically far more advanced with respect to 
productivity measurement and dynamics. The 
econometrically advanced frameworks come at a cost, 
however. They demand more from the data. For this 
reason the analyses in Cappelen et al. is done on a 
smaller sample than our analyses. In what follows, we 
compare their results to ours, focusing on the parts 
that are most closely related.  
 
Cappelen et al., table 2 is based on the knowledge 
stock approach similar to our equation (4), but in 
levels, not first differences. They use labour 
productivity as their left hand side variable, and 
assume that the effect of physical capital is absorbed by 
a random time invariant firm component in the error 
term.15 They include various control variables and 
allow the time varying part of the error term to be first 
order auto-regressive. The model is estimated by GMM, 
and they find an overall net return to R&D around 12 
%. Using a modified specification, they report 8 % in 
Cappelen et al (2007b). They find no significant 
difference between R&D financed by SkatteFUNN and 
other R&D, comprising both privately financed R&D 
and R&D financed by direct grants.16 In section 6.4 
above, we tend to find a somewhat lower return to 
SkatteFUNN R&D as compared to privately financed 
R&D, but then R&D financed by direct subsidies is 
treated separately. 
 
In table 3, column (1) Cappelen et al. use an R&D 
intensity approach very similar to our table 6.1 column 
(1). The main difference is that they use labour 
productivity where we use TFP and they use OLS while 
we use random effects GLS as estimation method. They 
do not control for capital, but otherwise they include 
more control variables than we do. They find a gross 
rate of return equal to 13 % in their sample of 2349 
firms from the years 2002 to 2005. This is quite close 
to our 15 % based on a sample of 12 081 firms from 
the years 1994 to 2005. They include in their 
specification a dummy for firms applying for 
SkatteFUNN and find that labour productivity growth 
of these firms does not differ from non-applicants in 
the year they apply. Note that this is quite different 
from what we do in table 6.2 where we explore the 
returns to R&D in SkatteFUNN firms by interacting a 
                                                     
15 This is modified in Cappelen et al (2007b). 
16 Cappelen et al (2007a) find a slightly positive effect. Using a 
modified specification, Cappelen et al (2007b) find a slightly 
negative effect. None of the effects are significant. 
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dummy for receiving the tax credit with the R&D 
intensity, both lagged one year. 
 
The main specification in Cappelen et al is a structural 
model of supply and factor demand with R&D capital. 
The basic framework is developed in Klette and 
Raknerud (XX). The main advantage of this framework 
is that it incorporates monopolistic competition and 
models explicitly the simultaneity between productivity 
and the choice of factor inputs, cf. footnote 12. Their 
general result is that SkatteFUNN has a weak, but 
positive effect on firm performance. The framework 
allows them to calculate the overall rate of return to 
the SkatteFUNN subsidy by industry and year. They 
find a positive, but modest return. Their estimates vary 
between 1 % and 7 % with 3 % as the median return. 
The return tends to increase over time.17 
 
                                                     
17 This is more evident in Cappelen et al (2007b) where data from 
2005 is included. 
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This report first investigates how participation in the 
Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme affects probability 
of receiving other R&D and innovation subsidies. We 
find no evidence suggesting that the R&D tax credit 
increase the probability of receiving direct R&D 
subsidies in the future, but we cannot exclude the 
possibility of an immediate positive effect. At the 
individual firm level direct subsidies and the tax credit 
seems to be complements, while at the innovation 
system level they seem to be substitutes as the 
probability of receiving direct subsidies has fallen after 
the introduction of the tax credit scheme. Next, we 
compare the additionality of the R&D tax credit with 
direct R&D subsidies. Our preferred estimate suggests 
that each public krone spent on tax credits for firms 
investing below the 4 million cap on intramural R&D 
increase private intramural R&D by 2.68 krone. This 
estimate builds on an assumption of zero additionality 
for firms above the 4 million cap. We find that the 
additionality of subsidies awarded through the 
Research Council and Innovation Norway is 2.07 and 
1.53 respectively. The additionality of grants awared 
by ministries and other public agencies is 0.64, and the 
additionality of R&D subsidies from the EU is 0.75. We 
stress the potential for both positive and negative 
biases in these estimates. 
 
Direct subsidy programs have public agencies involved 
in choosing the R&D projects that receive financing. 
Their aim is to select projects with large externalities 
that would not have been undertaken without the 
subsidy, i.e. projects that have a low private return. A 
tax credit, on the other hand has no such selection 
process attached to it, hence firms will rank projects 
according to their private return. Much of the subsidy 
will then be paid to inframarginal projects that would 
be undertaken even without a subsidy, i.e. projects 
with a high private return. The mechanism utilized by 
the government is simply to induce more R&D by 
lowering the marginal price. If the different subsidy 
schemes work according to “theory”, projects should 
differ with respect to private returns depending on 
their source of financing.  
 
We develop a framework for estimating the returns to 
R&D projects with different type of funding, and find 
support for this prediction. We find that projects 
funded through direct grants have essentially zero 
returns. Direct R&D subsidies are meant for projects 
with low private return and high social return. Our 
finding is therefore consistent with a high quality grant 
allocation process. The actual point estimate is 
probably downward biased due to measurement errors. 
 
Our estimate for the return to R&D projects financed 
by tax credits is just slightly below the return to R&D 
projects financed by own funds. The estimated returns 
are 16 % and 19 % respectively. These estimates are 
surprisingly low for two reasons. First, R&D 
investments are considered to have high risk, and 
should therefore earn a risk premium. Second, the 
estimates represent “gross” returns, meaning that 
depreciation of the knowledge capital stock is not 
accounted for. As mentioned above, however, the 
estimates are likely to be downward biased by 
measurement errors. Furthermore, there is large 
variance in the returns to R&D projects. When we 
estimate the return parameters year by year, we find 
that they vary considerably around the estimated mean 
value in our sample period. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
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